The Megawati’s defeat didn’t happen overnight. It wasn’t a result of a single blunder. And it wasn’t because of a bad luck. It is due to a simple and good reason which none of the Megawati’s camp is perhaps willing to admit, at least for now. Defeat is always bitter and it often obstructs people from thinking rationally of its causes. It takes wisdom to admit and recover from a major defeat. But more than wisdom, it takes courage to fix what went wrong and build a victory out of a defeat. For now these two words may sound strange for Megawati’s camp and her strong supporters. But the impact of a defeat will be long lasting and very destructive unless the losers understand the two words and adopt them accordingly in their future works and planning.

As someone who happened to work closely with the Megawati’s camp for a brief period of time, I have a first-hand observation of the way the camp was operating. The rest of this article is based on that experience in addition to my rational evaluations of the situation. My intention is neither to ridicule the loser nor to offer condolence. It is to show that wisdom and courage are fundamentally needed in order to survive and be victorious in the near future.

Assuming that the Megawati’s camp has admitted the defeat, so, what next? A truly honest admission should be subsequently followed by a sincerely honest self-evaluation. What went wrong? It’s true that there are some factors that Megawati’s camp couldn’t control. For example, her status as a woman itself is to some extend a liability given the way her direct or indirect opponents have often exploited the issue both in the past and in this year elections by claiming that in Islam woman is not acceptable to be a nation’s leader. But the defeat can be mostly attributed to the Megawati’s camp failure in conducting a correct and strong campaign. Here are some of the hints, starting from the day before the presidential campaign season kicked off.

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It was in May 31, 2004. At around 12PM, people were packed at Megawati’s official residence at Teuku Umar 33, Jakarta. Megawati and Hasyim, the VP candidate, were going to hold a press conference at around 12PM. The residence was packed with domestic and foreign press people as well as Megawati’s operatives. I was among the crowd and stood behind the powerful Taufik Kiemas, Megawati’s husband, and some Megawati’s ministers who attended the press conferences, including Laksamana Sukardi. Megawati and Hasyim took the center stage. They sat on chairs with table in from of them. Sucipto, one of the top PDIP (Megawati’s party) officials, sat down next to Megawati’s left. He was going to moderate the press conference.

By all account, before Megawati took the stage, it was really a modest press conference. The scene was not showing much of indication that a presidential candidate—who was also a sitting president, together with her vice-presidential candidate, would be having a major press conference. Shortly before Megawati and Hasyim took the stage, a few folks were still working to put some pamphlets behind the stage. The next day, on June 1, 2004, the campaign for president was officially kicked off. Isn’t that natural to have a tasty and sound pre-introduction before kicking off the main course?

But forget about this late preparation and the modest, if not a rather dull, scene. The more damaging was the moment when Megawati took the stage and thereafter episode.  Looking like she had been staying up late the night before or had been working tirelessly through out the morning, Megawati didn’t look presidential, at least to me. She wasn’t fresh. She didn’t show the energy. And she certainly didn’t show enthusiasm. How can a leader can stimulate others’ enthusiasm if she herself or he himself doesn’t first have the enthusiasm? The press conference was covered by almost all national and some foreign media. In a matter of minutes or hours, her performance would be all over the news. It’s already a bad sign.

Back in the early May of 2004, in a memo I sent to the Party’s national committee—to Megawati’s camp, I wrote that “You have to convince the Indonesian people that Ibu Megawati is the right figure to lead the nation...” and “...as a result of the new election system, the campaign strategy has shifted from negotiation to promotion.”

But hardly did I see that the Megawati’s camp understood the new paradigm. For decades, the Indonesian people elected their president and vice president through their representatives, not through a direct election. There was no a strong need for the candidates to promote themselves. It was enough to push hard in the parliamentary election and then negotiate with other parties. Well, if we assume that Suharto’s factor was absent. But it wasn’t. Suharto and his party, Golkar, basically controlled the past elections and there was not much incentive for the two remaining parties, PDI and PPP, to pursue creative ways in getting more votes. It is understable, therefore, if the old politicians—even to some extend the inexperience ones—who are controlling the Megawati’s camp didn’t understand the implications of the new election system. The new system—a direct election, as I wrote in the memo, demands creative and more persuasive campaign methods.

As the press conference went on, the lack of Megawati’s enthusiasm, energy and the presidential gesture became secondary to her serious incoherency in delivering her campaign agenda and answering questions from the press. Instantly, I recognized that there was something wrong here. Why Sucipto moderated the conference? And, why on earth the conference had to be moderated? Wasn’t that much better, instead of sitting at her chair Megawati stood when she delivered her campaign agenda and held Q-A session directly from the press without some of them have to be explained by the moderator? Show your leadership. Alas I didn’t see that.

The way Megawati delivered her campaign agenda was shocked me and most of her answers to the questions were bizarre. Who did I really see? I asked myself, “Is this just a bad day?” I was nervous, disappointed, mad, and determined to do something. But often the combination of those feelings was not a good sign. Megawati spoke slowly as if no more energy left in her body, and read vaguely her economic agenda for 2004-09. She read the outlines of the agenda without further explaining even one sentence what the agenda means, let alone to mention a simple reason behind it and how to achieve it. She closed her short speech by saying “should you have any question about my economic agenda, please ask my economic team”.

Ok, fair enough. The president doesn’t need to detail her agenda in a brief press conference. But when a presidential candidate says that she or he will create about 13 millions of jobs in five years, she or he must have a general picture of how to achieve it. In the US for instance, President Bush wants to maintain a relatively high economic growth and create jobs. His prescription: cut taxes. Does it make sense? Well, at least one can connect the story from cutting taxes to creating more jobs and boosting economic growth. Cutting taxes means more money flowing to the consumers and investors than to the government. With extra income, investors will expand their investments which will create more jobs. This means the supply of goods and services increases. Similarly, cutting taxes means that consumers will have more money to spend which will increase their demand for goods and services. These two forces will create more jobs and higher output (economic growth). It is a simple story although the real mechanism is not so simple. But at least as a presidential candidate, Bush can deliver a powerful campaign program in a simple line that common folks can understand without having to think the complicated and detail matters behind it.

On the contrary, Megawati seemed to have no idea what’s on in her economic agenda. No punch line and no assurance. It was dull and vague. The first part of the conference only reinforced my view that Megawati might not be the best candidate around. And if I were an independent voter, I would certainly think so. But I went to Jakarta to help Megawati’s camp. For better or worse, she was, in my view, the best candidate for president for the next five years. She has at least had a record to run. All that was needed was a capable campaign team, and, if she got elected, a capable and clean administration. It is better to improve the current government rather than entirely change it with a new one. I saw there was still a chance to improve it—at least at that time.

As the conference went on, my doubt of Megawati’s chance of being elected was growing. A journalist from Reuters asked Megawati about her view on Susilo, her serious competitor—who is now the newly elected president. Specifically the journalist asked Megawati’s opinion about the perception, both reflected in polls and rumors, that Susilo would beat her. It was a good question because it provided Megawati a chance to contrast herself from her tough opponent. I thought that Megawati’s answer would look like this: “We have better programs and plans for the next five years. I have a record to run….etc. etc. …security is getting better, the economy is getting better and etc. We have been through various struggles for the last five years and none of them was easy. Nevertheless, as president, I am not yet satisfied with the results. We still need to work hard and to continue the direction, and that’s why I am running again for president. My programs and plans for the next five years will bring the nation to a much better development. I am confident that the Indonesian people will choose the candidate who has the best records, programs and commitment to work for the country. And I believe I am the candidate who represents those.”

The bottom line is Megawati must sound confident, stay positive, mention her achievements and draw distinction between her and her opponent—Susilo. Instead, she blasted the journalist, “Enak aja Anda bertanya demikian” (It’s easy for you to ask such question). Wow. I was shocked and speechless. My disappointed was suddenly up to the roof. The rest of the press conference, in my view, was a disaster.

However, unbelievably, when I asked some party’s and Megawati’s strong supporters their opinion about the press conference, their answers varied from “satisfactory” to “not bad” assessments. Their reason was such press conference was something new. They said Megawati never held any press conference before. And so apparently a disaster was better than nothing.

Suddenly I realized that there was really something wrong with her campaign. Where was the personality factor? Where were the messages? And where was the coordination? Without a charm—or at least sympathetic personality, a presidential candidate better packs his or her stuff and abandons her or his campaign entirely. It’s impossible to win a presidential race without a charm. Right from the start, Megawati didn’t show her enthusiasm for the race. Being calm or quite is one thing, being enthusiastic and charming are quite another.

After the press conference was over, I joined the top campaign people at the lunch table. All in my mind was, “Does Megawati deserve to win the race?” Or, “if she deserves, how to make it happen?” Something must be done. Three important things must be improved significantly, or else the defeat would be certain. The first is the candidate’s personality and energy. Secondly, the messages and policy must be clear, right to the point, correct (answer the nation’s economic and social problems) and yet must have some grounds, not just a bunch of slogans. And thirdly, the campaign needs a strong and effective team who understand the nature of the new game. These are essentially my basic message in the memo: the three M (Messages, Messenger and Medium). The latter, the medium, is an effective campaign team and network, while the main messenger is Megawati herself. And, as I wrote also in the memo, Megawati’s camp must set a target of 35% votes in the first round. That would be a competitive number to compete in the second round and win the race.

While sitting down on the table, I was thinking the first thing I could do. I blamed the disaster to the campaign team. They should have briefed Megawati on some important issues to address and answer. They should have set the press conference as a real pre-introduction to the main course. They should have staged the conference in such a way that it would reflect the leadership of Megawati. They should have done better, much better, not like an amateur player who is on his first day of practice. While the messenger must look presidential, the messages must also be well prepared. I then talked to the head of the campaign’s economic team, Sri Adiningsih. I said that the Megawati’s economic and social development plans needed to be explained, needed to be revised and made them sound for a campaign. In my view, which I of course didn’t mention to her, the quality of the five economic and social recommendations they prepared was not more than that of a simple paper of a college freshman. Preparing messages for a presidential campaign message, in a direct election system, is totally different from writing a paper for a popular, non-academic, seminar. Adiningsih rejected the idea saying that the explanations had already been given. The simple brochure which contained the Megawati’s five economic and social development plans, she said, was accompanied by a big paper. Really? Do public need to read a big paper? All public want to know is the ideas and how to implement them. In a simple language, keep it simple, stupid!

For about two weeks, I continue to pursue this matter because I believed that the Indonesian people needed to know what Megawati really wanted to do to improve the nation’s economic and social developments and how she would do it. And besides, if you cannot compete on the personality and charm issues, you must compete on the messages. In my interview at the Metro TV on the same day, I stated my observation that all presidential candidates still spoke on what, not how. For example, a candidate A said he would create a 7% of annual economic growth. This is a what statement. But, much important is how we would do that? The public want to know the how, not the what. Megawati’s camp was still operating under the what mindset.

One may ask, did the press conference really have something to do with the Megawati’s defeat? As mentioned in the beginning, her defeat can hardly be attributed to a single event. While it certainly was not entirely due to her May 31, 2004 conference, it does give a clear picture as what went wrong with her camp. It was started with a very bad opening.

Next:

Part 2. Where were the messages

Part 3. The lessons for 2009