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A Self-destructive Play or a Winning One

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NATIONAL ISSUE
 

Syari’ah-ization of Indonesia

This is part of Chapter 4 "The Good, the Ugly, and the Bad" of our forthcoming book "The Indonesian Dream".

06/24/2009

The Inspiration

About 86.1% of Indonesians embrace Islam as their religion, Protestant 5.7%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 1.8%, other or unspecified 3.4%.

The fact that Indonesia is a predominant Muslim country has become a source of inspiration for some groups of people to establish an Islamic state. The attempts have a long history. Perhaps the most famous attempt was the unsuccessful proposal in August 1945 to include the seven words “dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya” (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syari’ah, or Islamic law) in the preamble of Indonesian Constitution. In 1950s, the country had to face internal confrontations when the militant Muslim groups known as Darul Islam launched rebellions to establish an Islamic state.

Through out the late 1960s and early 1990s, the advocacy of an Islamic state was essentially forbidden. In his thirty-two years of rule, the former President Suharto, successfully managed to place religions at the periphery of politics in Indonesia by uniting existing Muslim political parties into the PPP (United Development Party), which became the only official political vehicle for Islam. His most significant policy in “uniting” the country perhaps was when he issued a law that required that all political organizations must adopt Pancasila, the state ideology, as their sole principle (asas tunggal) in 1983, sealing the likelihood that Indonesia, at least during his years of rule, would become an Islamic state.

The Suharto’s departure and the development of democracy in the country in 1998 have opened new opportunities for the proponents of Islamic state. Their methods vary from radical violence to persuasion. The Jemaah Islamiyah which is responsible for the Bali bombing (and many earlier bombings) represents the extreme violent fringe of the spectrum. The hard-line groups such as the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly (MMI) which have launched a series of violent attacks on minority Muslim sects in the country and closed down churches in Java that do not have permits to operate also fall into this category.[i]

The Strategy

For many Indonesian Moslems, political persuasion is the right way. A number of new Muslim political parties such as Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) and Moon and Star Party (PBB) emerged in 1998 to push the idea of amending the Constitution to include Shari’a law. The Justice Party (Partai Keadilan), for instance, has a long-term, legalistic strategy for bringing about the implementation of Islamic law.

So far, they are still failed.

A notable proportion of Indonesian Moslems support religious diversity. The two main religious organizations for Muslims, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are officially opposed to the idea of the Islamic state and support the separation of religion and state. Abdurrahman Wahid the former Indonesian president and as well as former head of NU, an organization known as the "traditionalist Islam" and has become the most solid defender of the principle of the secular state, does not aspire to an Islamic state for Indonesia and strongly rejects any formalization of religion within the state.[ii] And Hasyim Muzadi, the former head of NU, views that the struggle for the enforcement of syari’ah in Indonesia is not realistic. Instead, he urges the promotion of universal values for the people’s prosperity.[iii] 

Some elements of leadership at Muhammadiyah, an organization known as “Modern Islam”, also against the formalization of religion within state. Syafi’i Ma’arif, the head of Muhammadiyah, was once said, “I believe that many people within our community will condemn our stance, but I have warned them that we must be committed to promoting unity, which our founding fathers declared when establishing this nation”.[iv]

The proponents of Indonesia as a non-religious state essentially support the idea that Indonesia is a quasi-religious nation. In that sense, religions function to equip people with moral and ethical values, but not dictate what public policies ought to be. Public policies are designed by democratically elected people’s representatives, and laws are made to govern and accommodate all Indonesians. For instance, laws that prohibit a certain kind of fashion should never be erected just because religions mandate it so. Unlike in secular countries, the proponents of a quasi-religious country believe that religions should not be forbidden from public discourse and sphere.

Nevertheless, the prospect of an Islamic state of Indonesia, or Indonesia based on Syari’ah-style law, remains open. And the strategy has changed. While the attempts to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia are still present, the main objective has shifted to the enforcement of Indonesia based on Syari’ah-style law. This is due to a simple reason: minimal support. For instance, in a poll conducted by Lingkaran Survey Indonesia in 2006, among 700 respondents they surveyed, only about 11.5% supported establishment of an Islamic state in the country.

Not surprisingly, during the period of constitutional reform from 1999 to 2002, the debates over the idea of Islam becoming the foundation of the state (Dasar Negara)—by adding the seven words to the Constitution’s preamble—have shifted to the special rights of Muslims and the obligation for the government to implement syari’ah—by amending the Constitution to add the seven words to Article 29.

Yet, they still got minimal support.

In August 2002, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or known as MPR) officially rejected the call for amendment. Several Islamic parties, including two of the main ones such as PPP (United Development Party) and PBB (Crescent Moon and Star Party), failed to convince other parties to support the inclusion of syari’ah into Article 29. With only 12 percent seats in the Parliament in 2002, the two main Islamic parties, the PPP and PBB, lodged a formal proposal to amend Article 29 by reinserting syari’ah into the Constitution.

Judging from the 2004 General Elections, the prospect of  amending the Constitution to include syari’ah may be not so promising—yet. In the elections, the PPP party won 8.2 % of the votes, PKS 7.3 %, and PBB 2.6 %. Put together, the three main Islamic parties received 18.1% of the vote, an increase from 13% in 1999.

However, in the 2009 legislative election, the three parties only managed to collect 15% of the votes. PKS pocketed  7.88%, PPP 5.32%, and PBB only 1.79%.

If this an indication of support for the three parties’ main platform on Syariah law, it shows that almost 80% to 85% of the Indonesian Moslems were not in favour of the parties’ campaigns to implement syari’ah at the State level.

The Shifting

Given the still relatively minimal support for the implementation of syari’ah law on national or State level, the syari’atisation strategy in Indonesian politics has shifted from constitutional (kulliyah) to artificial (furuiyyah) demands.[v] With many moral claims, the implementation of elements of Syari’a law has suddenly become popular political commodities that are dominating Indonesian political discourse. Bills and other regulations which indicate the adaptation of syari’a law began to appear everywhere. Starting with Bill on banking that was authorized in 1998, Education Bill in 2003, and Draft on Pornographic Bill in 2006 which sparkedcontroversies. Gus Dur or Abdurrahman Wahid for instance asked legislators to reject the bill and claimed that those who supported it did so out of fear of hardline Muslim groups.[vi]

As Anies Rasyid Baswedan wrote, “The focus is no longer on how to bring Islam into the foundation of the State, but how to bring Islamic coloration into policies produced by the State”.[vii] In addition, attempts to implement syariah-based law are not only done on State level, but also, more intensively, on regional level.

Already dozens of regions across the country have enacted syari’ah-style bylaws or have used the more permissive political climate to implement Shari'a-based bylaws including bans on alcohol and prohibitions on women going out alone at night. After Aceh which officially adopted syari’ah under the special Autonomy Law, many regions have followed suit. Initially, only a few regions such as Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Padang and Bulukumba introduced this bylaw. In 2003, only seven districts had such faith-based laws in place.  In 2005, 13 regencies demanded syari’ah. By February 2007, 53, more than 10% of all Indonesian regencies, are living life under some form of Islamic-inspired law. More places are expected to implement similar initiatives in the coming year. If the trend continues at the same rate, in 2011, more than half of all Indonesian regencies will be based on syari’ah-style bylaws.

“I don't want to contemplate the possibility of Indonesia becoming a Shari'a-based state, but I'm worried that it could happen,” says Yenny Wahid, director of the moderate Muslim Wahid Institute in Jakarta. “Even though I believe the majority of people in Indonesia don't buy the idea of an Islamic state, the extremist groups have convinced people that to be a good Muslim, you must support an Islamic state.”[viii]

In an interview with the Jakarta Post, Syafi'i Anwar, the executive director of the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), said that the growing efforts to implement syari’ah are really part of the gradual "syari’ah-ization" in the country. Or as Arsekal Salim and Azyumardi Azra put it, “creeping syari’atisation Indonesian style”.[ix]

Commenting on the tragic case of Lilis Lindawati, who was jailed in Tangerang for three days and branded as a prostitute merely for waiting to catch a bus after dark, Anwar said that Tangerang regency apparently issued the bylaw not only to fight prostitution but mainly to follow in the footsteps of other regions in implementing one of the aspects of syari’ah.

The implementations of syari’ah laws by regional governments are harmful to national unity. “These efforts are part of a process which is destroying the state ideology of Pancasila and is threatening Indonesia’s Constitution. The culprits are bureaucrats and political elites in areas that have been hijacked by syari’ah-style Islam”.[x]

The central government did almost nothing to scrutinize the regional syari’ah-style bylaws, which legal experts say are often in violation of the Constitution. Denny Indrajaya of UGM observed that in some areas, the legal draftings of the laws violated National Bill No. 10/2004 on the formation of Laws. And a number of the Regional Laws enacted apparently done in a rush way by just copying and pasting them. Even in some Regencies, those who proposed them apparently forgot to change the names of the Regencies.[xi]

The absence of the central government’s scrutiny has triggered the speedy of Syari’ah-izationprocess. In fact, Ahmad Suaedy, an Islamic scholar who is also the Wahid Institute’s executive director, warned that Indonesia will turn into an Islamic state if the government does nothing to counter the violence committed by hard-line religious groups or the repressive, syari’ah-inspired bylaws passed by local governments.[xii]Some of the regencies have even adopted syari’ah in a way that discriminates against minority groups. For instance, the Padang municipal administration issued a bylaw requiring all schoolgirls, regardless of their religion, to wear the jilbab (Muslim headscarf).

Another instance is related to a group known as the Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (Komite Penegakan Syariat Islam, KPSI) is actively campaign for the implementation of Islamic law in the South Sulawesi province. The KPSI believes that the province should be given Special Autonomy, including formal implementation of Islamic law and governance under the ultimate control of an unelected Council of Ulamas (religious scholars). Although it has a relatively small membership (about 3,000 followers) in the province, KPSI’s leaders are among influential figures in business, politics and academics. The KPSI also has militia wing, Laskar Jundullah, which has frequently been employed to intimidate the KPSI’s local detractors and, as South Sulawesi Police Chief Inspector, General Firman Gani stated, instigate violence including the McDonald’s bombing and its members’ plan to attack churches in the province.[xiii]

In respond to the KPSI’s pressure, the governor’s office formed a team to investigate popular opinion on Syariah Islam and the possible effects of its formalization. The team found that 86 per cent of Sulawesi’s population did not agree with the formalization of Islamic law at this time. Almost 30 per cent of respondents did not think that the local population had sufficient knowledge of Islamic law to make an informed decision.

The Majority's Attitude

But the attitude of Indonesian Moslems toward Shari’a law is somewhat unclear. A 2006 poll by the Indonesia Survey Institute found that 58% of Indonesians believed adulterers should be stoned, as is mandated by Islamic law, up from 39% five years before. However, in a survey carried out by Lingkaran Survei Indonesia in the same year, 69.6% of the 700 Indonesians polled favored a political system based on the current state ideology of “Pancasila” (five pillars), which combines monotheism, pluralism and secularism.[xiv]

As mentioned before, the survey also found that about 11.5% of the respondents supported the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. While it may look relatively small in terms of percentage, that could mean more than 20 million people out of Indonesia's total population of over 220 million.

The proponents of Islamic state of Indonesia are not always the less educated people or religious teachers. Student cells in the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), two leading Indonesian state universities, which had sworn oaths of allegiance to the Proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia. These student cells declared the Sukarno–Hatta declaration of an independent republic in August 1945 as null and void.

"There's a new feeling in Indonesia that people have been burned by secularism, that it's not working," says Zulkieflimansyah, a former UI student president and a legislator from Indonesia's biggest Islamic political party, the Justice and Welfare Party. "Islam can give them hope, and our mission is to educate Muslims about the real Islam."[xv]

At the University of Indonesia, for example, an estimated three in four students are members or sympathizers of the "Prosperous Justice Party," or PKS, whose its among platform is the implementation of Syariah-based law in Indonesia.[xvi]

"For others, like President Wahid, Islam is only a way of life. Their parties have Muslim members, but they don't want an Islamic state. For us, Islam is an ideology with political goals, including Islamic law," said Ahmad Sumargono, head of the Crescent Star Party and author of "I Am a Fundamentalist."[xvii] Ahmad Sumargono is currently doing his doctorate degree in University of Diponegroro, one of the leading state universities in the country.

The Ongoing Battle

For Islamic parties or for those who strive to amend the Constitution to change the foundation of the State or to include Syariah law in the Constitution, it requires two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Given the reality, this may take many more decades—or perhaps it would never happen at all. Mutammimul Ula of PKS realized this. “It would take 50–70 years to re-open the debate, in reference to the period of more than 50 years (1945–2000) before discussion of Article 29 began in a constitutional way. Or, it would never arise again.”[xviii]

But the fight is not over—yet.

As Hamdan Zoelva from PBB stated, “our party has proposed to include syari’ah in Article 29. We have to stop our struggle due to limited support from other members of the MPR, but the idea is still there, and we will never withdraw our proposal. In terms of constitutional debate, this is not the end of our struggle”.[xix]

Indeed, it is a constant struggle between the idea of Islamic state or Indonesia syari’ah-based law and of Indonesia as a quasi-religious country. This is a struggle that will continuously affect the political, social, economic and religious lives in Indonesia.

Which side will prevail? And will majority of regional governments adopt syari'ah laws?

The answer depends upon the view of the Indonesian people about religion—whether religion is a way of life that promotes humanity and inclusiveness or whether religion is a total way of life that elevates exclusivity and promotes division.

Certainly, emphasizing one religion in the Constitution over others means that the State is no longer neutral toward all its citizens. This will eventually invite problems of inequality, discrimination and other intended and unintended divisive outcomes. And no matter what the justification behind it, it may already contradict the fundamental teaching of all religions in the first place.

Isn't that religion a means to promote connection with the Supreme Being and inculcate moral and ethical values?


 

[i] Islamic state only a step away: Scholars. Ridwan Max Sijabat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta Post," June 08, 2006

[ii] Mujiburrahman, ‘Islam and politics in Indonesia: the political thought of Abdurrahman Wahid’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 10,

3 (1999): 344.

[iii] Jakarta Post, 30 Dec. 2002.

[iv] Jakarta Post, 25 July 2002.

[v] Shari’a and Politcs in Modern Indonesia. Dr. Arsekal Salim and Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra. Institute of South East Asia, Singapore 2003.

[vi] Gus Dur & Sinta Nuriyah Tolak RUU APP "DPR Takut Pada Islam Garis Keras” http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2450&Itemid=1

[vii] Anies Rasyid Baswedan (2004). “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory” Asian Survey, September/October 2004, Vol. 44, No. 5, Pages 669-690.

[viii] Hannah Beech (2007). “Why Indonesia Matters”. Time. Thursday, Feb. 22, 2007

[ix] Arsekal Salim and Azyumardi Azra Shari’a (2003). Politcs in Modern Indonesia. Institute of South East Asia, Singapore 2003

[x] Ibid.

[xi] GATRA Magazine’s Edition VII April 2006 issue, the Wahid Institute’s supplement.

[xii] Islamic state only a step away: Scholars. Ridwan Max Sijabat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta Post," June 08, 2006

[xiii] Jennifer Donohoe. The Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI).

[xiv] Majority of Indonesians Oppose Islamic Law, Western Democracy. Kyodo News, 25 Agustus 2006.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] The Wall Street Journal April 7, 2007.

[xvii] Islam's New Face Visible in a Changing Indonesia. Robin Wright, Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, December 27, 2000.

[xviii] Nadirsyah Hosen (2005). “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36 (3), pp 419–440.

[xix] Ibid.


 

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