Epitaph of A Javanese Colony

Bill Guerin*

Indonesia's acute mishandling of the international aspect of the East
Timor problem over 24 years left them wide open for attack from all
quarters. The Habibie administration received the last rites in June 1999
from a totally disenchanted population, but the damage to international
relations and perceptions has, and will continue, for longer.

Nonetheless, it is pertinent to ask how much of the flak over East
Timor is based on factual evidence and deserved, and how much is based on an apparent desire by much of the West to inflict a status of
international leper on the Indonesian nation?

Fact - Prior to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, it was an
abandoned Portugese colony geographically within the Indonesian, one nation, archipelago and in a state of civil war.

Fact - Indonesia has a desperately poor record of respecting human
rights in the province, and has been accused, over the years, of widespread intimidation, torture, abuse and murder.

Indonesia has nowhere to run in facing up to the accumulated bile and
wrath of the international community over the mayhem and savagery
allegedly perpetrated by Jakarta funded militias, and the military themselves before, during and after the August 30 1999 referendum in East Timor.

The historical dimensions then can be seen as very largely true but
think for a moment about the dimensions that lost out by default.

President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie surely deserves some credit for
squaring up to the military and offering the East Timorese their first
ever chance to determine their own future, something never offered by
Portugal, who walked away from their colony.

However, his great mistake was to offer it so quickly. This
'undermined a decision of the MPR', as current President Megawati Sukarnoputri put it in her address to the nation on 29 July 1999

The result of the vote, an overwhelming majority of 78.5% rejecting
Habibie's 'special autonomy' and opting for independence, came as a
complete shock to Indonesians of all levels

By then, of course, it was too late for any damage control from Jakarta
- the die was cast.

Habibie released Xanana Gusmao before the result of the ballot was
announced. Indonesia had never, until that year, seen this Nobel Laureate as anything other than a terrorist - the sea change in the Jakarta position was evidence in itself of a wish to take a pro-active stance on all aspects of the coming vote and the aftermath.

This was all the more impressive considering that his brother in arms
had threatened the complete destruction of the Indonesian banking system by hired hackers.

In response to these efforts from Jakarta the misinformation campaign
continued with its rabid anti-Indonesian theme, much of it at variance
with the real facts.

For example, in 1974, after four centuries of colonial rule, East Timor
had a total of 50 schools and no colleges - it now has 687 schools and
three colleges. The province then had only two hospitals and fourteen
health clinics, but now has ten hospitals and almost two hundred health
centers. Perhaps more tellingly, there were 100 churches in 1974 and
there are now 518.

US assistant secretary of state Kenneth Quinn testifying to a senate
committee in March 1992 said '…. Indonesia has, on a per capita basis,
funneled over six times as much of its own economic development budget into East Timor as to any other province." He noted also that, in nominal terms, the 170 million US dollars from Indonesian Government grants, was almost exactly one hundred times more than the average yearly development expenditure for East Timor in the last days of colonial rule (and all of this was in loans to be paid back to the Portugese)

The highly respected Richard Woolcott (Australian Ambassador to Jakarta
1975-78 and also Permanent Representative at the UN) also identified
earlier misinformation when he observed

"In 1976, Francisco Da Cruz was quoted by the world press as saying
60,000 had been killed in East Timor. The next day he said he had been
misquoted. What he had said was 60,000 had 'lost their lives or homes'
and this figure included over 30,000 refugees from East Timor who had
fled the civil war to Indonesian West Timor'. Mr Woolcott went on to say
'through a process not unlike think of a number and double it, and what
is called incestuous interquote- and with the active assistance of the
pro-FRETELIN lobby - what began as a figure of 60,000 was gradually
escalated to 200,000 or a third of the population."

There was a perception among Indonesians that UNAMET managed,
deliberately or otherwise, to convey a message that the UN's wish was for an independent East Timor, a view well supported by the Australian paper The Age leaking the 'news' that the UN had already prepared a draft document related to a provisional Government in East Timor.

If this was also the perception of many East Timorese they could be
forgiven for imaging that it was already a 'done deal' anyway, and they
had better vote for secession. So much for neutrality and
non-interference.

The view from Indonesia remains to this day that UNAMET was
provocative, and defended the interests of the West. Some extreme opinion here saw it much more simply, as a golden opportunity for the West to access and exploit the natural resources in the region.

Extreme, or otherwise, this Indonesian perspective was rarely heard
outside Indonesia and the alleged sexual harassment of 19 Indonesian
females by highly paid foreigners of UNAMET, the earlier incidences of the Indonesian flag being lowered and replaced, and other reported
incidents, were largely ignored by the outside world.

The subject of militias believed to be working under instructions from
the military to harass the pro-independence group is fully documented
from the stand point of the West and the savagery and butchery is
unlikely to be forgotten for years to come.

But in beating Indonesia with this stick at every chance, natural logic
is being sidelined to a degree. If the West, collectively, saw in 1999
that all East Timorese who wanted integration were 'militia', what was
the point of having a ballot as this alone suggested immediate civil
war if the 'militia' lost the vote.

The East Timorese population at large was not 'armed militia' any more
then than it was in 1975 and later on during the annexation. The
majority of the East Timorese community, the farmers, those owning small businesses and 'ordinary' people knew that independence would mean they had to start all over again, and with no certainty that they could sustain relative prosperity as they had done under the Indonesian flag since 1975.

The destiny of the East Timorese was, by consent of all external
parties, entirely for them alone to decide, although little opinion from the
West shared the Indonesian belief that a sizeable proportion of East
Timorese DID want integration.

These 'non militia' Timorese saw a chance of a better future within a
new Indonesia. They see that the inflexible military stance in
monopolizing civil affairs, which has occasioned so much suffering and abuse of human rights in the province was likely to alter with the change of President.

Their beliefs should, at least, have been respected and not, as was so
very clearly observed from May to August 1939, taken to be the views of
a minority.

The Military always justify oppression in East Timor by their fight
against the armed insurgents, Fretelin and may indeed have used the
secession issue as justification for the excesses but The issue of East
Timor, even for Fretelin, did not start out as secession - the quarrel was
essentially with the New Order Government, and specifically with
Soeharto and the brutality of the military.

These armed guerillas, Marxist to a man, now appear as champions of
free speech and democracy

The military feel betrayed over East Timor and wonder why they lost so
many troops and officers in the struggle against armed guerillas for
almost a quarter of a century. Is it any wonder, they argue, that they
sided with the pro-integrationists?

Pro integrationists placed their hope in a new Government, a new
President, and a lower profile military after the DPR session scheduled for
November that year. Pro independents believed the grass is greener on
the other side of the fence and they could evolve from jungle fighters,
oppressed by violent military activity over two decades or more to a
nation state, to their benefit.

Who is to doubt the beliefs of either side - this should have been real
democracy at work and the issue is for the East Timorese alone to
decide - both sides have equal chances to win by the ballot box. The ballot also gave East Timorese very special democratic rights not available for their fellow Indonesians in any other province.

The UN Secretary General said in May 1999-" the Government of Indonesia is responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or
interference from any side"

Then look what happened. UNAMET advised the UN Secretary General to
agree that the vote does take place on that day, August 30, regardless,
whilst taking every opportunity to slate the Indonesian Government,
military and police for NOT having achieved the requisite standard of
security.

The extreme haste with which the West and the UN seized the 'door of
opportunity" (to use the words of the UN Secretary General's special
envoy Jamsheed Marker), and although not satisfying the UN's own criteria for security for the vote still decided to 'do it anyway' must have been a determining factor in the climate of violence that ensued

General Wiranto, as the then Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Amed
Forces, when the East Timor atrocities were being perpetrated, can not
avoid the responsibility of a Commander. This is not the same as
saying he can be 'punished' for specific incidents, without any shadow of
proof that he was involved, either personally, or by proxy

When he claims ''There is a burning question, why did chaos break out?
Sadly there was one trigger which we did not count on -- unfairness in
implementation of the ballot,'' does he have a point worthy of
considering?

Or is the truth of everything related to Indonesia's grip on East Timor
forever to be pronounced on by foreign eyes only and not ordinary
Indonesians who can be forgiven for wanting to draw a line of the dark and bitter past?

Bill Guerin*
The Jakarta Eye
www.jakartaeye.com

Bill files weekly as the Indonesian Correspondent for the Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com - rotating between politics and the economy - and has for the last two years been the Editor of both the Mandiri English Language News Center and the online Indonesian Observer - www.indonesian-observer.com (closed down on 2 April 2002). He is also an accredited journalist with www.correspondent.com and has filed copy for the BBC in London.

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Last updated 4/14/02